Brentano on Judgment by Kriegel, Uriah
	 1	
Brentano	on	Judgment	Uriah	Kriegel				‘Judgment’	is	Brentano’s	term	for	any	mental	state	liable	to	be	true	or	false.	This	includes	not	only	the	products	of	conceptual	thought,	such	as	belief,	but	also	perceptual	experiences,	such	as	seeing	that	the	window	was	left	open.	‘Every	perception	counts	as	a	judgment,’	writes	Brentano	(1874:	II,	50/1973a:	209).	Accordingly,	his	theory	of	judgment	is	not	exactly	a	theory	of	the	same	phenomenon	we	today	call	‘judgment,’	but	of	a	larger	class	of	phenomena	one	(perhaps	the	main)	species	of	which	is	what	we	call	judgment.	Even	if	we	keep	this	in	mind,	though,	the	profound	heterodoxy	of	Brentano’s	theory	of	judgment	is	still	striking.			 Brentano	develops	this	heterodox	theory	in	some	detail	already	in	the	
Psychology	from	Empirical	Standpoint	(Brentano	1874/1973a).	But	he	continued	to	work	out	its	details,	and	various	aspects	of	it,	until	his	death.1	Many	of	the	relevant	articles,	notes,	and	fragments	of	relevance	have	been	collected	by	Oskar	Kraus	in	1930	and	published	under	the	title	Truth	and	Evidence	(Brentano	1930/1966b).	Kraus	prefaces	this	volume	with	an	elaborate	reconstruction,	of	dubious	plausibility,	according	to	which	Brentano’s	accounts	of	judgment	and	truth	have	gone	through	four	distinct	stages.	In	reality,	there	is	a	unified	underlying	conviction	underwriting	Brentano’s	work	both	on	judgment	and	on	truth	(see	CHAP.	20	on	the	latter).	Here	I	present	this	unified	core	of	this	highly	original	theory	of	judgment,	which	can	be	captured	in	terms	of	three	main	theses.	The	first	is	that	contrary	to	appearances,	all	judgments	are	existential	judgments	(§1).	The	second	is	that	the	existential	force	of	judgment	is	indeed	a	force,	or	mode,	or	attitude	–	it	does	not	come	from	the	judgment’s	content	(§2).	The	third	is	that	judgment	is	not	a	propositional	attitude	but	an	‘objectual’	attitude	(§3).		
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1. All	Judgments	are	Existential	
	The	most	fundamental	thesis	in	Brentano’s	theory	is	that	every	judgment	is	in	the	business	of	affirming	or	denying	the	existence	of	something.	The	judgments	that	there	are	zebras	and	that	there	are	no	dragons	are	thus	paradigmatic	instances.	It	is	natural	to	think	that	not	all	judgments	are	of	this	sort	–	some	are	in	the	business	of	not	only	affirming	or	denying	the	existence	of	something,	but	also	in	the	business	of	saying	what	something	is	like,	what	properties	it	has.	Thus,	the	judgment	that	all	zebras	are	striped	predicates	stripedness	of	zerbras,	thereby	committing	not	only	to	the	existence	of	zebras,	but	also	to	their	character.	Brentano,	however,	insists	that	the	psychological	reality	of	judgments	is	very	different	from	this.	Judging	that	all	zebras	are	striped,	for	example,	is	in	reality	an	existential	judgment	as	well	–	it	is	the	judgment	that	there	is	no	non-striped	zebra.		To	show	that	this	generalizes,	Brentano	systematically	goes	over	the	four	types	of	categorical	statement	in	Aristotle’s	logic	and	shows	that	they	are	all	reducible	or	‘traceable	back’	(rückführbar)	to	existential	statements	(Brentano	1874:	II,	56-7/1973a:	213-4;	see	also	Brentano	1956:	121):	(A) <	All	zebras	are	striped	>	‘traces	back’	to	<	There	is	not	a	non-striped	zebra	>.	(E) <	No	zebras	are	striped	>	traces	back	to	<	There	is	not	a	striped	zebra	>.	(I) <	Some	zebras	are	striped	>	traces	back	to	<	There	is	a	striped	zebra	>.	(O) <	Some	zebras	are	not	striped	>	traces	back	to	<	There	is	a	non-striped	zebra>.	These	are	the	only	four	types	of	categorical	statement	in	Aristotle’s	logic.	In	addition,	however,	Aristotle	recognizes	hypothetical	judgments.	Brentano	offers	an	existential	‘account’	or	‘tracing	back’	of	those	as	well.	He	writes:	
The	statement	(Satz)	“If	a	man	behaves	badly,	he	harms	himself”	is	a	hypothetical	statement.	As	far	as	its	meaning	is	concerned,	it	is	like	the	categorical	statement	“All	badly-behaving	men	harm	themselves.”	And	this,	in	turn,	has	no	other	meaning	than	that	of	the	existential	
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statement	“A	badly-behaving	man	who	does	not	harm	himself	does	not	exist,”	or	to	use	a	more	felicitous	expression,	“There	is	no	badly-behaving	man	who	does	not	harm	himself.”	(Brentano	1874:	II,	59-60/1973a:	218)		The	proposed	treatment	of	hypotheticals	is	this:	(H)	<	If	a	clown	does	not	wear	a	pointy	hat,	then	he	is	not	funny	>	is	traceable	back	to	<There	is	not	a	non-pointy-hat-wearing	funny	clown	>.	Brentano	concludes:		
The	traceability-back	(Rückführbarkeit)	of	categorical	statements,	indeed	the	traceability-back	of	all	statements	which	express	a	judgment,	to	existential	judgments	is	therefore	indubitable.	(Brentano	1874:	II,	60/1973a:218)	More	cautiously,	Brentano	should	have	concluded	that	all	statements	used	in	
Aristotelian	logic	turn	out	to	be	disguised	existentials.	He	does	not	consider	other	kinds	of	statement	in	any	notable	detail.		 What	does	this	‘traceability-back’	prove?	For	Brentano,	it	shows	that	non-existential	judgments	are	dispensable	–	positing	them	plays	no	explanatory	role.	Yet,	it	involves	considerable	ontological	cost.	In	a	1906	letter	to	his	student	Anton	Marty,	he	writes:		
…	every	assertion	affirming	your	entia	rationis	[notably,	propositions]	has	its	equivalent	in	an	assertion	having	only	realia	[i.e.,	concrete	individual	objects]	as	objects…	Not	only	are	your	judgments	equivalent	to	judgments	about	concrete	objects	(reale	Gegenstände),	the	latter	are	always	available	[for	paraphrasing	the	former].	Hence	the	entia	rationis	are	entirely	unnecessary/superfluous	(unnütz)	and	contrary	to	the	economy	of	nature.	(Brentano	1930:	93/1966b:	84;	see	also	Brentano	1956	§17)	The	argument	evidently	proceeds	in	two	steps.	The	first	is	to	show,	as	we	have	just	seen,	that	every	indicative	statement	that	expresses	a	judgment	can	be	paraphrased	into	an	existential.	The	second	step	is	to	argue	that	significant	ontological	economies	are	enabled	by	the	paraphrase.	Two	such	seem	close	to	Brentano’s	heart.	First,	if	some	judgments	are	predicative,	then	their	contents	are	propositional,	which	means	that	there	are	propositions.	Secondly,	what	such	predicative	would	seem	to	be	about	
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are	states	of	affairs,	which	means	that	there	are	states	of	affairs	as	well.	In	contrast,	Brentano	seems	to	claim,	existential	judgments	do	not	require	a	propositional	content,	and	what	they	are	about	can	be	individual	objects.			 What	motivates	this	last	claim	is	Brentano’s	notion	that	existential	judgments	are	not	about	existential	states	of	affairs,	and	thus	do	not	have	existential	propositions	as	their	contents,	but	are	simply	about	the	entities	whose	existence	they	affirm.	Brentano	makes	the	point	clearly	in	the	already	quoted	1906	letter	to	Marty:	
[T]he	being	of	A	need	not	be	produced	in	order	for	the	judgment	“A	is”	to	be	…	correct;	all	that	is	needed	is	A.	(Brentano	1930:	95/1966b:	85)	The	existential	is	about	the	existent	itself,	and	not	the	fact	of	the	object’s	existence,	that	makes	true	the	relevant	existential.	If	this	is	true,	then	indeed	we	have	here	a	remarkable	result:	all	judgments	are	existential,	and	existentials	are	about	individual	existents,	not	existence-facts.			 What	is	the	reason	to	take	the	existent	itself,	rather	than	the	fact	of	its	existence,	to	make	true	the	existential	judgment?	Brentano	offers	an	argument	from	infinite	regress	(1930:	95-6/1996b:	85-6;	see	also	Bergmann	and	Brentano	1946:	84	and	Brentano	1930:	122/1996b:	108).	Suppose	for	reductio	that	belief	in	my	dog	Julius	is	made	true	not	by	Julius,	but	by	Julius’	existence.	Then	in	addition	to	Julius,	we	must	add	to	our	ontology	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing.	That	is,	we	must	commit	to	the	existence	of	this	state	of	affairs.	To	commit	to	this	state	of	affairs’	existence	is	to	judge	that	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing	exists.	But	then	what	makes	this	judgment	true?	If	it	is	the	state	of	affairs	of	the	existence	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing,	then	we	are	off	on	a	regress.	The	simplest	way	to	avoid	the	regress	is	to	recognize	Julius	himself	as	the	making	true	the	Judgment	that	he	exists.			
2. The	Existential	Force	of	Judgment	
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If	the	existence	of	Julius	does	not	show	up	in	the	content	of	the	existential	judgment	that	affirms	Julius’	existence,	then	in	what	sense	is	the	relevant	judgment	an	
existential	judgment	at	all?	The	answer	is	that	the	judgment’s	existence-affirmation	must	be	built	into	its	intentional	mode	(since	it	does	not	figure	in	its	intentional	content	and	has	nowhere	else	it	could	be	“put”).			 The	idea	here	is	that	existential	judgments	are	existence-affirming,	but	not	existence-ascribing.	Their	existence-affirmation	is	an	aspect	of	the	judgment	
attitude	rather	than	content.	Brentano	writes:	
The	most	natural	expression	is	“A	is,”	not	“A	is	existent,”	where	“existent”	appears	as	a	predicate…	[Such	an	existential	statement]	means	rather	“If	anyone	should	think	of	A	in	a	positive	way,	his	thought	is	fitting	(entsprechend)”.	(Brentano	1930:	79/1966b:69)		On	this	view,	mental	commitment	to	the	existence	of	X	is	not	an	aspect	of	what	the	judgment	represents	but	of	how	it	does	the	representing.	We	may	put	this	by	saying	that	an	existential	judgment’s	commitment	to	the	existence	of	X	is	not	a	matter	of	representing	X	as	existent,	but	a	matter	of	representing-as-existent	X.	Thus,	to	judge	that	some	zebras	are	striped	is	to	perform	a	mental	act	that	represents-as-existent	striped	zebras,	that	is,	represents	striped	zebras	in	an	existence-affirming	manner.		As	for	negative	existential	judgments,	such	as	that	no	zebra	can	fly	backwards,	Brentano’s	view	is	that	these	represent-as-nonexistent	their	intentional	objects,	in	this	case	a	backward-flying	zebra.	This	means	that	for	Brentano,	there	is	a	categorical	difference	between	negative	and	positive	judgments	–	the	former	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	latter.	Whereas	we	are	now	inclined	to	think	that	there	is	only	one	judgment-mode,	and	that	negative	judgment	regarding	p	just	amounts	to	judging	that	~p,	Brentano’s	view	is	that	there	are	two	primitive	and	mutually	irreducible	judgment-modes,	the	positive-judgment	mode	and	the	negative-judgment	mode.	We	might	put	this	by	saying	that	Brentano	posits	disbelief	as	a	fundamental	doxastic	state	on	a	par	with	belief.		Brentano	appears	to	have	three	arguments	for	the	‘attitudinal’	or	‘modal’	account	of	(positive)	judgments’	existence-affirmation.	The	more	explicit	(and	
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weakest)	argument	appears,	to	my	knowledge,	only	in	Brentano’s	lecture	notes	from	his	logic	courses	in	Vienna	at	1878-9	and	1884-5	(Brentano	1956	§15).	Those	who	maintain	that	existence-affirmation	is	an	aspect	of	content,	says	Brentano,	must	have	the	following	picture	in	mind.	When	you	judge	that	the	Pope	is	wise,	you	put	together	the	concept	of	Pope	and	the	concept	of	wisdom.	If	so,	then	likewise,	when	you	judge	that	the	Pope	exists,	you	put	together	the	concept	of	Pope	and	the	concept	of	existence.	But	note,	says	Brentano,	that	you	cannot	judge	that	the	Pope	is	wise	without	acknowledging	(annerkenen)	the	Pope,	that	is,	representing-as-existent	the	Pope.	By	the	same	token,	you	cannot	judge	that	the	Pope	exists	without	acknowledging	the	Pope.	But	now,	it	would	seem	that	acknowledging	the	Pope	is	not	only	necessary	but	also	sufficient	for	judging	that	the	Pope	exists	–	there	is	nothing	in	the	latter	not	already	in	the	former.	Since	the	commitment	to	the	Pope’s	existence	is	already	built	into	this	attitude	of	acknowledging,	there	is	no	point	in	replicating	that	commitment	within	the	act’s	content.	All	there	is	to	judging	that	X	exists,	then,	is	acknowledging	X,	that	is,	taking	a	certain	distinctive	attitude	toward	X.	Brentano’s	second	argument	for	building	existence-affirmation	into	the	judgment-mode	can	be	found	in	the	Psychology.	The	basic	idea	is	that	acts	of	judging	and	acts	of	mere	representing	(i.e.,	contemplating	or	entertaining)	can	have	the	same	content	(Brentano	1874:	II,	44-5/1973a:	205).	Yet	the	judging	commits	the	subject	to	the	reality	of	what	is	judged,	while	the	mere	representing	does	not	commit	to	the	existence	of	the	represented.	Therefore,	the	existence-commitment	exhibited	by	the	former	but	not	the	latter	cannot	come	from	the	content,	which	ex	
hypothesi	is	shared.	It	must	come	from	some	other	difference	between	judging	and	presenting.	The	best	candidate,	says	Brentano	(1874:	II,	64-5/1973a:	221-2),	is	an	attitudinal	or	modal	difference:	the	judging	represents	the	judged	in	a	way	that	the	mere	presenting	does	not	represent	the	presented.	A	further	argument	close	to	the	surface	in	the	Psychology	builds	on	the	Kantian	claim	that	‘existence	is	not	a	property,’	which	Brentano	cites	approvingly:	
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In	his	critique	of	the	ontological	argument	for	the	existence	of	God,	Kant	made	the	pertinent	remark	that	in	an	existential	statement,	i.e.	in	a	statement	of	the	form	‘A	exists,’	existence	‘is	not	a	real	predicate,	i.e.	a	concept	of	something	that	can	be	superposed	(hinzukommen)	on	the	concept	of	a	thing.’	‘It	is,’	he	said,	‘only	the	positing	of	a	thing	or	of	certain	determinations,	as	existing	in	themselves.’	(Brentano	1874:	II,	53/1973a:	211)	If	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	property	of	existence,	any	attribution	of	existence	to	something	would	be	attribution	of	a	property	that	nothing	has.	That	is,	it	would	perforce	be	a	misattribution.	But	in	fact	not	all	existential	beliefs	are	false:	it	is	true,	for	example,	that	there	are	ducks.	So	it	must	be	possible	for	us	to	affirm	the	existence	of	ducks	without	quite	attributing	the	property	of	existence,	which	they	do	not	have.	The	only	way	to	makes	sense	of	that	is	to	suppose	that	to	affirm	the	existence	of	ducks	is	just	to	adopt	a	certain	attitude	toward	ducks.			
3. Judgment	is	not	a	Propositional	Attitude	
	If	the	commitment	to	something’s	existence	or	nonexistence	shows	up	in	judgments’	attitude	rather	than	content,	then	the	content	itself	must	be	exhausted	by	the	individual	item	whose	existence	is	affirmed	or	denied.	If	a	judgment	that	a	three-legged	dog	exists	simply	represents-as-existent	a	three-legged	dog,	then	what	is	represented	is	just	a	certain	kind	of	individual	object:	a	three-legged	dog.	On	this	view,	then,	judgment	turns	out	to	be	an	objectual	rather	than	propositional	attitude	(Chisholm	1976).		It	has	sometimes	been	held,	at	least	in	analytic	philosophy	of	mind,	that	all	attitudes	are	propositional.	But	the	psychological	reality	of	mental	life	suggests	many	objectual	attitudes.	Typically,	one	loves	one’s	child,	not	(just)	that	she	or	he	is	one’s	child.	One	is	afraid	of	dogs,	not	(just)	that	the	dog	might	bite	one.	Brentano’s	theory	of	judgment	models	judgment	on	the	case	of	love	and	fear:	judgments	are	always	directed	at	some	sort	of	individual	object,	and	simply	represent-as-existent/nonexistent	that	object.	In	fact,	for	Brentano	all	mental	states	are	objectual	in	this	way	–	this	is	why	he	writes	that	‘All	mental	references	refer	to	things’	(1973a:	
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291).	(Here	‘thing’	is	used	to	refer	to	an	individual	object	or	concrete	particular,	and	‘mental	reference’	is	another	term	for	intentionality.)	It	might	seem	strange	to	posit	a	doxastic	attitude	directed	at	objects	rather	than	propositions.	Love	and	fear	are	emotional	attitudes.	Perhaps	emotional	attitudes	can	be	emotional,	but	are	not	doxastic	attitude	paradigmatically	propositional?	Clearly,	Brentano	does	not	think	so.	But	in	fact,	we	do	recognize	doxastic	objectual	attitudes	in	our	folk	psychology.	Consider	such	statements	as	‘Jimmy	believes	in	Santa	Claus.’	Belief-in	is	clearly	a	doxastic	objectual	attitude:	the	content	of	Jimmy’s	state	is	exhausted	by	some	individual	object,	Santa	Claus,	the	commitment	to	whose	existence	comes	in	at	the	level	of	attitude,	through	the	attitude	of	believing-in.	Now,	philosophers	may	wish	to	paraphrase	this	into	‘Jimmy	believes	that	Santa	Claus	exists,’	so	that	belief	is	always	construed	as	propositional.	But	for	Brentano	this	paraphrase	gets	things	backwards.	Talk	of	objectual	belief-in	is	actually	more	faithful	to	the	psychological	reality	of	judgment	than	talk	of	propositional	belief-that.	In	a	way,	we	can	see	it	as	the	whole	of	Brentano’s	theory	of	judgment	that	positive	judgment	is	just	belief-in	and	negative	judgment	is	just	disbelief-in	(Textor	2007,	Kriegel	forthcoming).	In	fact,	since	belief-in	talk	is	talk	of	an	ostensibly	objectual	rather	than	propositional	doxastic	state,	the	Brentanian	should	offer	the	opposite	paraphrase,	paraphrasing	belief-that	reports	into	belief-in	reports.	Consider	again	the	four	types	of	categorical	proposition	in	Aristotle’s	logic,	and	the	four	corresponding	types	of	categorical	belief.	The	Brentanian	should	offer	the	following	paraphrases	for	reports	of	such	beliefs:		(A)		 S	believes	that	all	zebras	are	striped	ó	S	disbelieves	in	a	non-striped	zebra	(E)		 S	believes	that	no	zebras	are	striped	ó	S	disbelieves	in	a	striped	zebra	(I)		 S	believes	that	some	zebras	are	striped	ó	S	believes	in	a	striped	zebra	(O)	 S	believes	that	some	zebras	are	not	striped	ó	S	believes	in	a	non-striped	zebra	
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As	for	hypothetical-belief	reports,	they	admit	of	the	following	Brentanian	paraphrase:		 (H)		 S	believes	that	if	a	clown	does	not	wear	a	pointy	hat,	then	he	is	not	funny	ó	S	disbelieves	in	a	non-pointy-hat-wearing	funny	clown	Here,	‘ó’	just	means	‘can	be	paraphrased	into.’	The	arrow	is	bidirectional	because	paraphraseability	is	a	symmetric	relation:	if	‘p’	is	a	good	paraphrase	of	‘q,’	then	‘q’	is	an	equally	good	paraphrase	of	‘p.’	As	we	have	seen,	Brentano	has	substantive	arguments	for	using	this	bilateral	paraphraseability	specifically	to	underwrite	a	uniform	account	of	judgment	as	an	objectual	(dis)belief-in.		An	immediate	concern	with	this	non-propositional	take	on	judgment	is	its	implication	for	our	understanding	of	reasoning	and	the	viability	of	standard	logic	for	modeling	it.	Certainly	propositional	logic	must	go	out	the	window,	but	so	does	predicate	logic,	since	in	Brentano’s	picture	there	is	no	element	of	predication	in	existential	judgments	(and	all	judgments	are	existential!).	Brentano	was	actually	acutely	aware	of	this	problem,	and	tried	to	address	it	in	some	of	his	logic	lectures,	notes	for	which	were	posthumously	published	in	The	Theory	of	Correct	Judgment	(Brentano	1956).	One	of	Brentano’s	and	Marty’s	students,	Franz	Hillebrand	(see	CHAP.	40),	developed	Brentano’s	logic	in	some	detail	in	his	habilitation	(Hillebrand	1891).	The	idea	for	both	is	to	just	reformulate	the	known	laws	of	valid	inference	within	a	non-propositional	framework.	Consider	a	straightforward	instance	of	
modus	ponens:	if	the	window	is	open,	the	room	gets	cold;	the	window	is	open;	therefore,	the	room	gets	cold.	In	Brentano	and	Hillebrand’s	reform	of	syllogistics,	this	becomes:	there	is	no	open	window	without	a	cold-getting	room;	there	is	an	open	window;	therefore,	there	is	a	cold-getting	room.	Formally,	the	idea	is	to	replace	the	familiar	
p	à	q	 	 p		
									 q	with	something	like	
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–a¯b	 	 +a										 +b	Here	+	is	an	existence-indicator,	–	is	a	nonexistence-indicator,	and	a¯b	means	‘a	without	b’.	The	rule	thus	reads:	there	is	not	a	without	b;	there	is	a;	therefore,	there	is	
b.	This	rule	for	valid	inference	is	either	to	be	deduced	from	more	basic	rules	or	is	to	be	added	as	a	basic	rule	in	its	own	right.	The	program	is	to	put	in	place	all	the	rules	we	accept	as	valid,	using	a	uniform	formalism,	and	then	prove	consistency	and	completeness.	Although	this	program	has	not	to	my	knowledge	been	fully	carried	out	yet,	see	Terrell	1976	and	Simons	1984,	1987	for	important	contributions.		
Conclusion		Brentano’s	theory	of	judgment	is	so	heterodox	that	it	has	never	made	any	notable	inroads	outside	the	most	entrenched	centers	of	Brentanian	philosophy,	in	Vienna,	Prague,	and	Innsbruck.	Certainly	within	analytic	philosophy	it	was	doomed	by	its	non-propositional	take	on	judgment,	which	greatly	limits	the	possibility	for	informative	linguistic	representation	of	judgments	and	their	content.	Yet	even	if	we	concede	that	propositional	structure	is	much	more	powerful	for	purposes	in	modeling	in	public	language,	the	psychological	reality	of	judgment	need	not	be	so	accommodating	to	our	purposes.	Brentano’s	arguments	that	the	psychological	reality	of	judgment	reveals	an	objectual	existence-affirming	attitude	must	be	contended	with.	As	the	above	brief	discussion	suggests,	these	are	by	no	means	frivolous.2			
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